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De Re Modality in the Late 20th Century:  
The Prescient Quine 
 
John Divers 
 
QuineÕs (in)famous skeptical critique of de re modality is expounded in the pair of 1953 classic 
papers ÔReference and ModalityÕ1 and ÔThree Grades of Modal InvolvementÕ.2 Here, I position 
the salient, and non-skeptical, treatments of de re modality in the later part of the twentieth 
centuryÑthose due to Kripke, Lewis and FineÑin relation to that prior skeptical critique. I 
emphasize the insights on which QuineÕs skepticism was based and commend these as sound 
and enduring.3 
 
1. QuineÕs skepticism 
In Three Grades of Modal Involvement Quine (1953b, 158-9) locates our subject matter within a 
systematic and philosophically neutral scheme of logical syntax. De re modal predication is what 
makes for Grade 3 in that scheme, and to explain what that amounts to we proceed, with Quine, 
via Grades 1 and 2.4  
                                                             
1 W. V. O. Quine, ÔReference and ModalityÕ, in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1953. Page references are to the second edition of the text (New York: Harper and Row 
1961, 139Ð59), and henceforth I refer to it with the abbreviation RM. 
2 Quine, ÔThree Grades of Modal InvolvementÕ, Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, 
Volume 14 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. Page references are to the reprint in Quine, The 
Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 158-
76, and henceforth I refer to this essay with the abbreviation TGMI. 
3 By inviting greater appreciation for QuineÕs achievements in this regard, I join J. Burgess, ÔQuinusab 
omni naevo vindicatusÕ in Mathematics, Models and Modality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 203-
35. 
4
 It would seem that QuineÕs method and starting point here is attributable to his Carnapian education: in 
particular, the approach to modal words as quasi-syntactic expressions that lead to metaphysical 
entanglements that we must attempt to avoid, wherever possible, be avoided by translation into explicit 
syntactical predicates. For a most informative discussion of CarnapÕs influence on QuineÕs modal 
skepticism in this respect, and in others, see Shieh (2013), esp. ¤36.4-5. 
Grade 1 modality is intentionally and explicitly metalingusitic. Here, a modal predicate (of 
necessity) attaches to the name of a (closed) sentence and so says something of, or about, that 
sentenceÑthus:  
(G1) ÔEverything is physicalÕ .  
Grade 2 modality by contrast, is located at the same syntactic level as its non-modal complement. 
Now, modality no longer stands above the object-language alongside the other means we have of 
talking about parts of that object-language, such as its sentences and words. Modality is now part 
of the object-language and it is part of our means of talking in that language about things other 
than languages. The modal expressions of Grade 2 are operators (It is necessary that __) of the kind 
that operate on closed, statement-expressing sentences (everything is physical) to make more 
complex closed, statement-expressing sentencesÑthus: 
(G2) It is necessary that everything is physical. 
In sentential modal logic (also known as propositional modal logic) this kind of sentence is 
regimented as A and the iteration of modal operators, A (It is necessary that it is necessary that 
everything is physical) is syntactically permitted. In that respect, the Grade 2 modal expressions 
function like other familiar operators such as the negation operator (It is not the case that ..). So 
syntactically, the difference between Grade 1 and Grade 2 modality replicates the difference 
between (F1) and (F2): 
(F1)  ÔEverything is physicalÕ is not so. 
(F2)  It is not the case that everything is physical. 
In both the cases of modality and negation, it is a good question why we have both sorts of 
construction (and how they relate to each other) but is a question beyond our immediate 
concerns with logical syntax. Continuing with those syntactic concerns, we might choose to open 
up the structure of the non-modal sentences of sentential modal logic to display their 
quantificational structureÑthus, for the representative of the structure of everything is physical we 
would naturally have ∀xPx. But it still counts only as Grade 2 of modal involvement if the 
modal operators only have immediately within their scope, closed (statement-expressing) 
sentencesÑthus: 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
that this quasi-syntactic strategy, and its successor when Carnap adopted semantics, canÕt work for  
 
(G2*) ∀xPx 
In (G2*), we are certainly using the characteristic symbols of quantified modal logic, in which 
modal operators combine with quantifiers, variables and predicates, to regiment (G2). But the 
move to Grade 3, and to quantified modal logic proper, comes only when we allow as well-
formed formulas a further kind of combination of these symbols. That is where a modal 
operator  operates immediately on a predicate Px (x is physical) to make a more complex modal 
predicate Px, (x is necessarily physical): and, just to simplify the statement of syntax rules, all such 
predicates are also called Ôopen sentencesÕ. Grade 3, then, allows as well-formed those formulas 
that we get when we close these open-sentences (predicates) to make closed sentences 
(statement-expressors) by placing some appropriate quantifier on the outsideÑthus: 
 (G3)  Everything is necessarily physical 
 (G3*)  ∀xPx 
So the definitive Grade 3 phenomenon is the occurrence of a modal operator (somewhere) 
between a quantifier-plus-variable and the variable that it binds: it is quantification across, past or 
beyond a modal operator.5 If we apply the notion of de re modal predication to the language of 
quantified modal logic it is (the appearance within sentences of) predication of exactly that kind. 
In such de re modal predication, a modal operator (of necessity, for example) contributes to the 
formation of a modal expression which is apt to predicate something modal of whatever the 
values of the variables are: of the things that the language is interpreted as being about. That 
much ought to be philosophically uncontroversial, and so ought the following statement: it is the 
purpose of quantified modal logic(s) to treat the inferential properties of modal expressions at 
Grade 3 (and encompassing those at Grade 2 as a special case). 
Against this background, Quine takes as methodologically equivalent commitment to the 
intelligibility of de re modal predication and commitment to the (semantic) adequacy of 
quantified modal logics. QuineÕs skepticism about de re modality is precisely the view that these 
twin commitments ought to be refused. What remains to be understood, then, is the case that 
Quine makes for his skeptical refusal of the de re modal package. In headline, QuineÕs case is 
(quite predictably) that we are to refuse the package because the associated benefits cannot be 
                                                             
5 The standard locution is Ôquantifying intoÕ a modal context. But, if left as that, this is a badly misleading 
description of the intended Grade 3 syntactic phenomenon. For, in my hearing at least,  Ôquantifying inÕ 
permits the understanding that a quantifier be put inside the modal operator. And that, being a Grade 2 
construction, is exactly what is not intended.  
purchased at acceptable costs. In the remainder of this paper, and reflecting the approach of 
Quine, I shall have nothing at all to say about what such benefits might be. Thus, I shall 
concentrate entirely on what Quine characterizes as the costs of accepting de re modality. 
 
2. QuineÕs case for skepticism 
In my understanding, the master-argument of ÔReference and ModalityÕ is as follows. Grade 3 
modal contexts are prima facie referentially opaque [RM ¤1, 139-44]. Since no-one can tolerate 
unexpurgated referential opacity in these contexts [RM ¤2, 144-50], the only questions are 
whether, and at what costs, Grade 3 modal contexts can effectively be purged of it. Then we 
have a dilemma. There are two broad strategies for purging referential opacity: the first of these 
(the language-dependence strategy) is demonstrably ineffective [RM ¤3, 150-54], while the 
second (the language-independence strategy) can be implemented only at unacceptable costs 
[RM ¤3, 154-56]. 
The demonstration of the prima facie referential opacity of de re modal predication, comes 
in the famous number of planets paradox: 
(N1)  The number of planets is 9 
(N2)  9 is necessarily greater than 7     
(N3)  The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7. 
We have a paradox in that it appears that all of the following conditions obtain:  (N1) is true, (N2) 
is true, (N3) is false and the step that takes us from the premises, (N1) and (N2), to the 
conclusion, (N3), is an application of an impeccable inferential principle (viz. the inter-
substitutivity of identicals).6 Two points about the subsequent tightening-up of the case for 
referential opacity are to be noted. 
Firstly, Quine feels bound to put his observation on a firmer footing by showing that an 
appropriate analogue of the number-of-planets paradox can be constructed at a more secure and 
significant level of syntax. So Quine attempts to free the issue from incidental considerations 
about the behaviour and introduction of singular terms, either in English or in quantificational 
                                                             
6 See RM ¤1 and TGMI ¤I. Perhaps the Ôapparent truthÕ of (N1) requires trans-generation explanation. 
Pluto was then classified as a planet and that the planets in question are supposed to be those in our solar 
system. 
logic. He does so by drilling down to the level of pure quantificational modal logic at which the 
only vocabulary is as follows: non-modal predicates; modal operators, sentence connectives, 
variables and the quantifiers that bind those variables. And what Quine finds here is the prospect 
of a failure of the inter-substitutivity of identicals that is utterly inescapableÑinescapable because 
(contrast modal English) there is no deeper level at which it might be analysed awayÑthus: 
(N1*) Fx   
(N2*)  x=y  
(N3*)  ~Fy    
QuineÕs negotiation of this syntactic transition, from our N-version of the paradox to our N*-
version of the paradox, is something that has been much discussed.7 But here I settle simply for 
asserting that, for our purposes, these details can be bypassed. 
Secondly, Quine is perfectly clear that, at this stage in the dialectic, the necessity (modality) 
involved is of a kind that Carnap and others in the broad camp of logical empiricism had been 
prepared to champion:8 that is, analytic necessity, or analytic-or-logical necessity or broadly 
logical necessity. Following usage established in the early twentieth century Quine tends to call 
this strict necessity [e.g. RM 143]. And he further refines his target by contrasting this strict 
necessity with the most prominent case of non-strict necessities: that is the physical or causal 
modalities that feature prominently in the informal exposition of the natural sciences [RM 158]. 
However, to capture QuineÕs intentions clearly the term analytic necessity is preferable. 
The crucial Lemma of QuineÕs master-argument for de re modal skepticism, then, is this:  
(Lemma)  If the quantification and the modality are both taken as ordinarily understood, 
then there is no obvious sense to be given to de re modal predication. [RM 150] 
What Quine means here by quantification Ôordinarily understoodÕ is quantification over what he 
would call extensional entities: these include the objects of folk theory (people, tables, tigers, 
mountains, stars É) and the objects, both concrete and abstract, of science (electrons, spacetime 
points, sets É). What Quine means by modality Ôordinarily understoodÕ is modality as ordinarily 
understood by those (Carnapian) philosophers he was addressing directly: thus, analytic modality. 
That there is no obvious sense to be given to de re modal predication so understood is a natural 
                                                             
7 On QuineÕs treatment of the related issues see Fine, ÔQuine on Quantifying InÕ in Modality and Tense: 
Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 115-30, and Burgess, ÔQuinusab omni naevo 
vindicatusÕ; the latter is sympathetic to QuineÕs aims, the former is not. 
8 See R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1947). 
and compelling thought, for what it appears to demand is this.9 Taking x only as x, it makes 
perfectly good sense to say that it is analytically necessary of x that it is F. And if having to make 
good sense of that were bad enough, we must do so while ensuring that we avoid the disaster of 
committing to cases in which it is analytically necessary of x that it is F and it is not analytically 
necessary of y that it is F and x=y (cf. (N*1)-(N*3) above). 
 
3. Strategies of responses to QuineÕs case for skepticism 
In face of QuineÕs Lemma, my preferred map of the (four) strategic responses available to a 
Ôfriend of modalityÕ is as follows: 
ACCEPT QUINEÕS LEMMA? 
 /   \ 
NO (Strategy 1)          YES 
    | 
  PERSIST WITH THE DEFENCE OF GRADE 3? 
/   \     
NO (Strategy 2)          YES 
     /  \ 
  Strategy (3)     Strategy (4) 
Maintain ÔordinaryÕ modality & Maintain ÔordinaryÕ quantification & 
invoke ÔextraordinaryÕ quantification  invoke ÔextraordinaryÕ modality 
(Language-dependence)   (Language-independence) 
                                                             
9 Here, and in what follows, it is easier for the reader to think only of cases of atomic ÔFÕ. Many 
qualifications and complications would have to be introduced in order to take into account at every stage 
the special case where  ÔFÕ can be instantiated by a complex predicate that is apt to express a logical truth 
(e.g. Ax v ~Ax). I claim, but wonÕt attempt to argue here, that the special considerations that apply to 
those cases do not put them beyond the thrust of QuineÕs critique. In any case, were de re modal 
predication to prove defensible in these and only these cases it would be de re predication of a modality 
that is rather dull and whose population is not obviously well-motivated. 
 Strategy (1) is to reject the Lemma. And earning the right to do that would involve undertaking 
to show either: (a) how Quine is wrong in his view of what doubly ordinary de re modality 
requires us to make sense of; or (b) how, despite appearances, we can make sense of such a de re 
combination of quantification ordinarily understood with analytic modality. All other strategies 
proceed from acceptance of QuineÕs Lemma. 
Strategy (2) is to retreat and defend only Ôde dictoÕ modal commitments: that is, to 
abandon de-re-modal-predication-cum-quantified-modal-logic and draw the line of defensible 
commitment under either Grade 1 or under Grade 2 of modal involvement. Pursuit of this 
strategy requires defence of the classification of some statements as analytic (and others as 
synthetic) and will still, thereby, involve confrontation with a Quinean modal skeptic.10 But 
modal skepticism of that kind, and the related confrontation, raises quite different issues from 
those in prospect here. 
Strategies (3) and (4) branch off from the acceptance of QuineÕs Lemma and involve 
attempts to defend de re modal predication under that constraint. The attempts in question 
depart from the ÔordinaryÕ understanding of one of the two elements involved in QuineÕs 
conception thus far of de re modal predication. Strategy (3) is to propose an ÔextraordinaryÕ 
understanding of the quantification that is involved in the de re modal predication. 
Acknowledging those who Quine takes to be its proponents, this might be called the Carnap-
Church strategy [RM 150-54]: more informatively, it might be called the language-dependence 
strategy. Strategy (4) is to propose an ÔextraordinaryÕ understanding of the modality that is 
involved in the de re modal predication. Acknowledging he who Quine takes to be its 
proponent, this might be called the Smullyan strategy:11 more informatively, it might be called the 
language-independence strategy. 
The aim of the language-dependence strategy, (3), is to make sense of de re modal 
predication by: (i) reconceiving the domain over which we quantify, and with a view to (ii) 
making the domain combine safely with the (intended) linguisticÑanalyticÑcharacter of the 
modality. So the re-conception of the domain of quantification is as a set of entities of a special 
                                                             
10 The locus classicus for this is Quine, ÔTwo Dogmas of EmpiricismÕ, Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20-43. 
11 See RM 154ff; TGMI 174 and A. Smullyan, ÔModality and DescriptionÕ, Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 
(1948): 31-7. It has been pointed out to me (by an anonymous referee, to whom I am grateful) that what I 
am calling ÒtheÓ Smullyan strategy is strictly only a Smullyan strategy. For Smullyan (1947, 140) seems to 
have also been tempted by the language-dependence strategy (3) on the grounds that co-referential proper 
names might always be reckoned synonymous. 
kind with natures that stand in intimate relations to ways of specifying them. The (historically) 
salient candidates for being entities of such a special kind are the individual concepts, or senses, 
that are postulated (in the tradition of Frege, Church and Carnap) to explain the phenomenon of 
true but non-analytic identity statementsÑfor example: Cicero is Tully, or, the first Postmaster General 
is the inventor of bifocals or the discoverer of Uranium is Marie Sklodowska-Curie. Thus, one such entity 
might be picked out as the-individual-concept-expressed-by-ÕCiceroÕ and another as  the-individual-concept-
expressed-by-ÕTullyÕ. However, puzzlement about the ontology that might be proposed to fit this 
strange, language-dependent bill, need not detain us. For Quine comes to think that he has a 
lethal objection to the strategy that depends only on the bill itself [RM 155]. 
To approach QuineÕs objection, recall the number-of-planets paradox. The natural 
diagnosis of the paradox is that it arises precisely because we ordinarily take the individual things 
that we quantify over, for example the numbers, to be susceptible to analytically inequivalent 
specification. Thus we have, ÔnineÕ, Ôthe number of planetsÕ but the (presumed) non-analyticity of, 
ÔNine is the number of planetsÕ. The most direct way of dispatching the paradox, then, is to 
legislate against such inequivalence: that is, to stipulate that your domain of quantification, in 
quantified modal logic, will contain only entities that can never be picked out (as variable values) 
by two conditions that are analytically inequivalent. Bypassing metaphysical worries about the 
source of such a guarantee, or the conditions of identity of the entities posited,12 we can proceed 
immediately to the destination at which Quine eventually arrives in the two classic papers. For 
QuineÕs ultimate complaint is that no such legislation can be effective: for it is provable that 
there are no such special entities of the kind it requires. The suggested proof is as follows. 
Assume that there is in the language a true but analytically contingent sentence p. (And afford 
that assumption more security by noting that the predication of analytic necessity of some truths 
is pointless unless that achieves contrast with others.) Then, given any condition, C, that specifies 
any x, we can immediately construct a condition, C* that also specifies x but is analytically 
inequivalent to CÑthat is:  C*(x) =df C(x)& p. So given modal distinctions of the very kind that 
the proponent of the strategy is trying to defend, there are no things that meet the requirement 
of being specifiable in a way that is analytically equivalent to no other. And, thus, Quine takes the 
Church-Carnap, strategy to be defeated by a proof. My purposes here require only that we 
register QuineÕs view that the failure that besets the language-dependence strategy is of exactly 
this level: it is demonstrably ineffective. I shall not comment further on QuineÕs proof, or on 
how a language-dependence strategy might otherwise be prosecuted. 
                                                             
12 See Quine, ÔNotes on Existence and NecessityÕ, Journal of Philosophy 40 (1943): 113-27. 
 3. Quine on the language-independence strategy 
The aim of the language-independence strategy, (4), is to make sense of de re modal predication 
by: (i) reconceiving the character of the modality involved, and with a view to (ii) making it 
combine safely with the (presumed) language-independent character of the entities in the domain 
over which we ordinarily quantify. So the reconception of the modality is as a language-
independent, non-analytic but still strict (not-merely-causal) modality, that applies to ordinary 
things independently of any considerations about how they are specified. Intending to capture 
exactly that (re)conception, I will call such modality metaphysical modality.13 The final, and most 
important business of this section will be to register three points about QuineÕs exposition of this 
language-independence strategy.  
Firstly, QuineÕs attitude to the Smullyan strategy is quite different from his attitude to the 
Church-Carnap strategy. For Quine does not claim that the prosecution of the Smullyan strategy 
for expurgating referential opacity is subject to decisive objection. Quine, of course, takes the 
prosecution of the Smullyan/language-independence strategy to be ill-advised and, perhaps, even 
misguided. However, this attitude stands in marked contrast with his attitude towards the 
Church-Carnap/language-dependence strategy, which he takes to be a non-starter for being both 
demonstrably ineffective and, moreover, ineffective for reasons that even its proponents ought 
to recognize and admit. 
Secondly, Quine predicts that prosecution of the Smullyanite, language-independence 
strategy will bring three very specific commitments: indeed he clearly and explicitly does so in 
                                                             
13 A caveat is in order concerning concerns the  ÔordinarinessÕ of the quantification that I have built into 
this (the Smullyan) strategy. The initially intended ordinariness involves, naturally, the objects of 
quantification being actual things as opposed to their being merely possible things. Yet, it might be required 
by a full prosecution of the Smullyan strategy across all the formulas of quantified modal logic (as per te 
semantics of Kripke (1963)) that the required domain of quantification turns out to not be very  
ÔordinaryÕ, in this respect, at all. In the case where a modal operator, especially a possibility operator, has 
wide scope with respect to a quantifier, as in it might have been that there were more trees than there actually are, 
the values of the variables might be taken either as non-actual-but-merely-possible trees, or as actual 
things that are not trees but might have been trees. Any such postulates will involve the friend of 
modality in a further confrontation with a Quinean modal skeptic of a kind: in this case, the skeptic about 
possibilia (the locus classicus for this is Quine, ÔOn What There IsÕ, Review of Metaphysics, 2 (1948): 21-38). 
But as remarked in the case of retreating to the defence of only de dicto modality, this move takes us into 
quite different philosophical territory. The issues I am presently exploring arise even if de re modal 
predications are restricted by stipulation to those involving quantification over only un-controversially 
existing actual, and otherwise ordinary, things. 
both Reference and Modality (154-6) and in Three Grades (175-6). The commitments in question are 
to:  
(Q1) the metaphysical doctrine of Aristotelian essentialism (as Quine represents that); 
(Q2)  a logic of variables and singular terms that is more complicated, and weaker, than the 
orthodox approach that is embedded in orthodox classical first-order logic (as Quine 
understands that)  
(Q3)  the status as a thesis of quantified modal logic, the principle of the necessity of identity as 
expressed by the formula, (=): 
 (=) ∀x∀y(x=y →x=y).14 
Thirdly, QuineÕs dialectic hasÑof courseÑparticular dialectical opponents in view. Those 
dialectical opponents were thinkers who shared with Quine allegiance either to a certain 
conception of logic, or to some form of logical empiricism, but felt able to do so while remaining 
friends of modality: thus, C.I. Lewis, Church and Carnap [RM 155-56]. It is this consideration 
that explains why Quine presumes that the three commitments that he lists will automatically be 
counted as costs, and as cumulatively unacceptable costs, of implementing the language-
independence strategy.  
In light of the foregoing account, certain lazy ÔtakesÕ on QuineÕs skepticism about de re 
modality are exposed as canardsÑnotably: that Quine argues that de re modal predication is 
absolutely unintelligible; that he is wrong-footed (or even refuted) by the Smullyan response to 
the number-of-planets paradox, or that he makes an unwarrented presumption that various 
commitments should be counted as costs. I contend that Quine deserves exoneration from such 
crass and unjust misrepresentations and that his achievements in this regard deserve greater 
recognition. Accordingly, I will attempt to show that there are few surprises, and certainly 
nothing that is apt to move Quine, in the salient philosophical defences of de re modal 
predication that followed his skeptical critique. My theses are: (a) that that the principalsÑ
Kripke, Lewis and FineÑall undertake non-skeptical defences of de re modal predication that 
conform to the, Smullyan, language-independence strategy, and (b) none does so in a way that 
falsifies QuineÕs prediction of the commitments involved. 
 
                                                             
14 I use the term ÔthesisÕ to gloss over (otherwise important) distinctions that are not immediately relevant: 
for example, that between axiom and theorem and between theorem and valid formula. 
4. Kripke 
The positioning of KripkeÕs defence of de re modal predication in relation to QuineÕs predictions 
is a relatively straightforward matter. For Kripke, as far as I am aware, does not dispute QuineÕs 
claim about which commitments a defence of de re modal predication will bring. Furthermore, 
Kripke (1980) consciously embraces and defends all three of the theses to which Quine claims 
the proponent of the language-independence strategy will be committed.15  
First, QuineÕs version of Aristotelian essentialism in Reference and Modality is a clearly and 
explicitly modal version of the doctrine: 
An object, of itself and by whatever name or none, must be seen as having some of its traits 
necessarily and others contingently, despite the fact that the latter traits follow just as analytically 
from some ways of specifying the object as the former traits do from other ways of specifying it. 
[RM 155] 
It is Kripke who is primarily responsible for developing and defending the notion of a strict but 
language-independent conception of modalityÑthe metaphysical modalityÑthat this version of 
Aristotelian essentialism requires.16 In that cause, Kripke naturally, and famously, advocates the 
truth of various cases of de re predication of such a metaphysical modalityÑfor example: that 
some things, such as Socrates, are necessarily human and some things, such as The Metre Rod, 
are contingently of the length that they actually are.  
Second, it is a characteristic feature of Kripkean semantic theories of (alethic and normal) 
quantified modal logics, as summarized and discussed in KripkeÕs 1963 ÔSemantical 
Considerations in Modal LogicÕ, that they pronounce as valid (over an appropriate range of 
model structures) the formula, (=). In Naming and Necessity Kripke also offers various 
considerations in support of this principle of necessity of identity so construed. 
QuineÕs remaining prediction is that the prosecution of the Smullyan/language-
independence strategy for justifying de re modal predication will result in a logic of variables and 
                                                             
15 To be thorough, one might consider the subtle prospect that Kripke (merely) chooses to embrace all 
three theses while, in some sense, he is not strictly (de jure) committed to them. In this paper I will put 
aside that subtlety in KripkeÕs case and in the cases of Lewis and Fine also: except to note one piece of 
important work that has been done under this heading in KripkeÕs case. Thus, given certain  Ôessential 
sentencesÕ that represent QuineÕs modal version of Aristotelian essentialism, and a semantic theory of 
quantified modal logics as per Kripke, ÔSemantical Considerations in Modal LogicÕ (Acta Philosophica 
Fennica 16 (1963): 83-94), Parsons (ÔEssentialism and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, Philosophical Review 78 
(1969): 35-52) shows what commitments concerning logical status of such sentences do and do not 
follow from (commitment to) the Kripkean semantic theory alone. However while ParsonsÕ results are 
non-trivial, they by no means exhaust the sources and kinds of commitment to essentialism that are 
important in the bigger philosophical picture. 
16 S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). 
singular terms that is more complicated, and weaker than, the Russellian approach that is 
embedded in orthodox classical first-order logic (as Quine understands it). A full examination of 
this matter, in the case of any of the philosophers to be discussed, calls for the separation of a 
number of strands in QuineÕs prediction: for example, restrictions on the introduction and 
elimination rules of quantifiers in the logic is one thing, the ÔconstructionÕ of singular terms from 
term-free resources is another. A full examination also calls for proper consideration of such 
thorny questions as how the singular terms in the logic might be supposed, by different parties, 
to relate to the idioms of natural language. However, in this paper I propose to take what I hope 
are informative shortcuts rather than offer a full tour. In that spirit, thenÑand thirdlyÑthe 
following specific theses are all identified by Quine as integral elements of the Smullyan strategy 
and Kripke endorses all three. (T1) There are fundamental semantic differences between names 
and definite descriptions;17 (T2) changes in the scope of descriptions with respect to modal 
operators do make for diffences in truth-value even when the description (actually) refers;18 (T3) 
Intersubstitutivity of variables takes place under restrictive semantic conventions governing the 
interpretation of variables. That is, the inter-substitutable variables are treated rigidly, in always 
being assigned to the same object in every world: absent that convention, and other things being 
equal, (=)would not be validated.19  
Thus, I conclude, KripkeÕs is a perfect example of a Smullyanite defence of de re modal 
predication as Quine foresees it. With both of the other philosophers to be considered, the 
evaluation is more complicated. And the common source of complication is their shared 
conviction that the metaphysical modality involved is non-primitive.20 
 
5. Lewis 
On seeing QuineÕs predictions, it is tempting to leap to the conclusion that Lewis confounds all 
three. For does not Lewis reject Aristotelian essentialist metaphysics and reject the principle of 
                                                             
17 RM 154 and Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp.24-6. 
18 RM 154 n.9 and Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp.10-14. So returning to the number-of-planets paradox 
and reporting the Smullyanite solution, it is held true that the number of planets (that very number, 9) is 
necessarily greater than 7 but false that it is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7 (because 
there might only have been five planets). 
19 TGMI 175 and Kripke, ÔSemantical Considerations in Modal LogicÕ. 
20 The exact point of contrast is that Lewis and Fine deny that the metaphysical modality is primitive 
while Kripke does not deny that. More precisely, Kripke does not take issue with QuineÕs presumption 
that a defence of de re modal predication would be a defense of it as  ÔprimitiveÕ, in the sense of its being 
part of logic proper and so of canonical notation. None of this, of course, is to attribute to Kripke the 
assertion that metaphysical modality is ÔprimitiveÕ in any respect. 
the necessity of identity and uphold a neo-Russellian descriptivism about singular terms? In each 
case, there is an important sense in which that is indeed so. Yet, Lewis is not directly at odds 
with Quine in these matters: and that is because Lewis is not party to a crucial presupposition on 
which QuineÕs predictions rely. 
Quine, crucially, presupposes throughout his critique of de re modal predication that 
modal content is represented directly by a modal logical operator, in a non-extensional modal 
logic: and for Quine, to appeal to such a modal logic is to put modal vocabulary as an element of 
canonical or primitive notation. For those friends of modality that Quine had in mind when 
posing his skeptical challenge were all primarily defenders of quantified modal logic. And LewisÕs 
treatment of de re modal predication is free of the commitments that Quine predicts precisely 
because LewisÕs treatment is free of the constraints that come with the commitment to interpret 
de re modal predication in a special modal logic. That a non-logical, non-canonical, defence of de 
re modal predication might be mounted is not in conflict with any claim that was earlier made 
here by meÑeither for my own part or on behalf of Quine. What was claimed earlier, and 
claimed to be a matter of impeccable philosophical neutrality, was that the treatment of the 
inferential properties of Grade 3 constructions is the purpose of quantified modal logic(s). Quite 
so. If we indulge in quantified modal logic then that is why we do it: that is what it is for. But that 
is not to say that the treatment of the inferential properties of Grade 3 constructions must be 
handled in that way, and to understand and orientate the Lewisian position on this matter 
correctly, a sequence of three points must be registered. 
The very first thing that Lewis does in approaching the interpretation of de re modal 
predication,21 is to distinguish between two ways of doing so: the way of quantified modal logic 
and the way of translation into a theory with a first-order, non-modal, logic. Next, Lewis asserts 
that the former, modal-logical, approach is not inevitable and then he proceeds to demonstrate 
that by presenting a (counterpart-theoretic) version of the other, first-order non-modal, 
approach.22 Thus, the counterpart-theoretic interpretation of discourse involving de re modal 
predication is one that involves logic only in a perfectly Quinean form: it is fully extensional 
classical first-order logic. The modal content of de re modal discourse is explicated in a non-
logical first-order theory, to which non-modal logic is applied: the domain of the theory in 
question is a domain of non-actually-restricted individuals (possibilia) and the postulates of the 
                                                             
21 David Lewis, ÔCounterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 113-26; 
page references are to the reprint of the essay in Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol. I (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 26-38, p. 26. 
22 David Lewis, ÔCounterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, p.26. 
theory govern counterpart relations over those individuals.23 24 The statement of these intentions 
in LewisÕ 1968 paper sets out a broad agenda from which he, in his subsequent theorizing of de 
re modality never departs.25 And to take proper account of this agenda we must handle matters 
with some care. 
First, Lewis claims that what is represented here by (=) is a modal principle (of necessity 
of identity) that should not be accepted.26 It is crucial to take seriously LewisÕs choice of 
terminology. What Lewis does not claim is that (=) is invalid or that is a non-theorem. For 
ÔinvalidÕ and Ônon-theoremÕ (and their cognates) are terms that are apt in discussing the model-
theoretic and proof-theoretic status of formulas of your logic, and Lewis is not considering the 
formulas of QML as formulas of his logic. In light of this crucial distinction (between the 
canonical and the non-canonical) QuineÕs intended and frequent observation in the matter, might 
be put, thus. If you locate de re modal predication in your logicÑand, a fortiori, in your 
canonical notationÑand you also refuse (=), then you make a nonsense of the logic of 
identity. For then you are denying that a primitive or canonical predication (such as F) is 
equally predicable of primitively or canonically specified identicals (by hypothesis, x and y). 
Certainly, if you take an apparent failure of intersubstitutivity of identicals to be merely a quirk of 
representation at a non-canonical levelÑlike English, or a logic into which non-variable singular 
                                                             
23 One potential cause of confusion here is the fact that the notation of quantified modal logic (QML) 
does have a significant role in the development of counterpart theory (CT) in LewisÕ 1968 paper. For the 
technical part of the paper offers a systematic translation of the formulas of QML into those of CT. But 
the point of that is to persuade those who are already convinced of the expressive virtues of QML that 
CT shares these. That is, if you think that de re modal discourse is represented systematically, and with a 
certain degree of expressive completeness, by the formulas of QML, you must accept that also for the 
formulas of CT. The non-technical part of the paper is to (begin to) argue that the CT representation of 
de re modal discourse is (at least) as adequate as the QML representation in broader semantic and 
philosophical respects. One can see how LewisÕs approach might be adapted and re-organised so that it 
would become, through counterpart-theoretic models, a genuine interpretation of quantified modal logic. 
See G. Hughes & M. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal Logic (Routledge: London, 1996), pp.353ff. But 
that was not LewisÕs project, and it is crucial in understanding the relationship of Lewis to Quine that this 
is understood. 
24 Another potential cause of confusion here is the fact that Lewis allows the way that we choose to 
specify things a role in picking out which counterparts enter into the truth-conditions of de re modal 
sentences in which those specifications feature. For is that not a clear renunciation of the Smullyan 
strategy that proceeds from language-independent modality? No. For we donÕt conceive the modal facts 
as language-dependent just because we rely on considerations about language to pick out which language-
independent facts (facts of objective similarity, for Lewis) they reduce to. For extensive discussion of that 
point see Divers, ÔQuinean Scepticism about De Re Modality after David LewisÕ, European Journal of 
Philosophy 15 (2007): 40-62. So LewisÕs position as a Smullyanite defender of de re modal predication is 
secure. 
25 Especially not so in the further classic sources of Lewis on modality: Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1973) and On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
26 David Lewis, ÔCounterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, p.36. To be truly precise, LewisÕs 
claim concerns the open analogue of (=). But that is irrelevant for present purposes.  
terms have been introducedÑyou always have the option of mitigating that by showing that it 
disappears at the canonical level. Indeed, Quine [TGMI 173-5] makes precisely this point on 
behalf of the friends of modality. So QuineÕs claim about (=) is about what must be involved 
in defending de re modal predication as a feature of canonical notation, beyond which there is 
nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. And the Lewisian rejection of the principle (=) does not 
provide a counterexample to Quine, for Lewis does not reject (=) while attempting to treat de 
re modal predication as a feature of a canonical notation. 
Second, the treatment of singular terms and variables in Lewis, as in the other cases, must 
be somewhat rough and ready here. However, here are the salient points. Given LewisÕs 
thoroughly Quinean conception of logic as classical first-order logic with identity, and adding to 
that the primitive predicates of counterpart theory, there is no obvious pressure from the logic of 
identity to depart from the Russellian conventions for introducing and eliminating singular terms 
via the description operator. There is no obvious need, thus far, to weaken or complicate the 
logic of identity or introduce supporting lemmas.27 However, if we ascend to a level at which 
modal expressions (the modal operators) are also in playÑintroduced, as it were, via their 
counterpart-theoretic ÔtranslationsÕÑthen Lewis is a self-identifying Smullyanite28 and he 
embraces the relevant Quinean predictions. That is, in the first place, it is acknowledged that de 
re predications involving modal expressions are in general scope ambiguous: they are translatable 
into the ÔcanonicalÕ notation of counterpart theory in scope-sensitive ways that are not logically 
equivalent. And the effect of this is precisely to force the need for Ôsupporting lemmasÕ in 
governing whether descriptively analysed terms are available as variable substituends for 
universal elimination or existential introduction. For such terms will be available only when the 
wide/de re translation is equivalent to the narrow/de dicto translation, and that is when certain 
further lemmas of counterpart theory hold.29 
Finally, Lewis is explicit in his endorsement of (his finding ÔcongenialÕ) QuineÕs version of 
Aristotelian essentialism.30 So, inter alia, what Lewis finds congenial is that objects have in 
themselves, and independently of any consideration of language, some traits necessarily and 
                                                             
27 To be fair, there are non-obvious objections to the effect that LewisÕs CT translations do require him to 
mess with the handling of variables in first-order logic. The objections are due to Hazen, ÔCounterpart-
Theoretic Semantics for Modal LogicÕ, Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 319-38, and Kripke (Naming and 
Necessity, 45n13) and here I can address them only insofar as I am prepared to state my conviction that 
Lewis deals adequately with these in his ÔPostscript to Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, 
in Philosophical Papers vol. I, 39-46, p.45. 
28 Lewis, ÔCounterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, p.33, n.16.  
29 Lewis, ÔCounterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, p.33-4. 
30 Lewis, ÔCounterpart Theory and Quantified Modal LogicÕ, p.32. 
other traits contingently. That is a modal commitment. But such a modal commitment need not 
be in itself much by way of a metaphysical commitment and not, a fortiori, a commitment to 
specifically Aristotelian metaphysics in any demanding sense. We appreciate the need to 
distinguish one kind, or level, of commitment from the other once, as we have established, the 
distinction between the canonical and the non-canonical (or primitive and non-primitive) is in 
play. For, as we have seen already in the discussion of (=), what one is committed to is one 
thing, and what one is committed to there being at the canonical or primitive level is another. Quine 
might be charged with making a mistake in taking fairly minimal commitments about what is 
necessarily (or essentially) this way or that and then characterizing these as acceptance of a very non-
minimal metaphysical doctrineÑthe metaphysical doctrine of Aristotelian essentialism (see, e.g., 
Quine 1953b, 176). In charity, though, we ought to recall QuineÕs presumption that the 
discussion is about what is defensible by way of a (modal) logic and, so, at the canonical level. 
And we ought to remind ourselves that what is perhaps the most famous Quinean dictum in this 
matter is precisely and explicitly about the consequences of championing a logicÑthus:  
ÔAristotelian essentialism should be every bit as congenial to (the champion of quantified modal 
logic) as quantified modal logic itselfÕ.31  
In sum, then, LewisÕs position affords no counterexample to anything that Quine 
predicted in this regard. Lewis does not commit to a deeply metaphysical Aristotelian 
Essentialism: that ÔfundamentalÕ reality is such that things have such modal features. But nor 
does Lewis commit to treating de re modal predication as a feature of ÔfundamentalÕ notation. 
And QuineÕs prediction, insofar as it might be put in these terms, was only that commitment to 
the latter would require commitment to the former. 
 
6. Fine 
There is no respect in which Fine needs to depart, or in which he actually does depart, from the 
commitments, (Q1)-(Q3), that Quine predicts. For, as I understand it, FineÕs, non-skeptical, 
Smulyanite, defence of de re (metaphysical) modal predication replicates the Kripkean position 
in acceptance of the modal doctrine of Aristotelian Essentialism, the necessity of identity in the 
form of (=) and the non-Russellian treatment of singular terms and variables.32 This is the 
                                                             
31 Quine, ÔReply to Professor MarcusÕ, Synthese 20 (1961): 177-84, p.184. 
32 The (now) classic source that I have in mind and to which I shall refer most frequently is K. Fine, 
ÔEssence and ModalityÕ, Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1-16. But see also, for example, Fine, ÔThe Logic 
point that is central to present purposes and it ought to be registered and acknowledged. But 
there is more here that needs to be explained and more to appreciate about Quine in the process. 
What remains to be understood about the agreement between Kripke and Fine, and what 
makes FineÕs work among the most significant on the topic, is this. After metaphysical modality 
is up-and-running, as it were, Fine may be viewedÑin all immediately relevant respects, and 
applying a broad brushÑas being as Kripkean as Kripke. And that is why, as noted, Fine, like 
Kripke, is in the position of fulfilling all of QuineÕs predictions about the language-independence 
defence of de re modal predication. Where Fine proceeds beyond Kripke is in taking us into a 
metaphysical ÔjungleÕ of Aristotelian Essentialism that Quine would have found deeper and 
darker than any jungle that he himself had dared to envisage. Kripke embraces the predicted 
commitments, (Q1)-(Q3), without indicating any departure from the Quinean presupposition 
that the defence of de re modal predication is to be a defence of de re modal predication as 
primitive. However, Fine (1994) rejects the primitive status of de re modal predication and 
regards Kripkean modal ideology (including all of the Quine-predicted commitments) as 
metaphysically and logically supported by deeper essentialist commitmentsÑthis position 
presupposing, of course, that the esentialist commitments are not simply equivalent to de re 
(metaphysically) modal commitments. In this regard, it is informative to consider QuineÕs second 
version of the metaphysical doctrine of Aristotelian essentialism given in Three GradesÑthus: 
This is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in 
which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the thing and others accidental. E.g. a 
man, or talking animal, or featherless biped (for they are all in fact the same things) is essentially 
rational and accidentally two-legged and talkative not merely qua man but qua itself. [TGMI 176] 
The first version of the doctrine, given by earlier quotation from Reference and Modality, I 
characterized as modal, because it involves explicit predications of the paradigmatically modal 
modifiers, ÔnecessarilyÕ and ÔcontingentlyÕ. This second version of the doctrine puts in the place 
previously occupied by those modal modifiers the explicitly essentialist modifiers, ÔessentiallyÕ 
and ÔaccidentallyÕ. Before Fine, mostÑand notably both Kripke and LewisÑacquiesced in the 
presumption, apparently shared by Quine, that nothing (much) was at stake in distinguishing the 
modal version of essentialism from the essentialist version of essentialism: hence the free and 
unconcerned movement back and forth between modal and essentialist predications.33 But the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
of EssenceÕ, The Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995): 241-73, and his ÔIntroductionÕ to Modality and Tense: 
Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1-18. 
33 This is not to say that everyone was happy to accept that all essentialist claims were adequately 
expressed through the notation of standard first-order quantified modal logic. See, for example, David 
Wiggins, ÔThe De Re ÔMustÕ: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist ClaimsÕ, in Truth and Meaning: 
Essays in Semantics, edited by Evans, G. & McDowell, J., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 285-
contention of Fine is precisely that modal predicationÑand especially de re metaphysically 
modal predicationÑis to be explained in terms of different and more fundamental 
considerations about essence. Thus, it is true of Socrates that he is (metaphysically) necessarily 
human: but the truth of this de re modal predication obtains in virtue of (the modal fact is 
Ôgrounded inÕ) non-equivalent facts about the essence of Socrates. And the facts about essence 
are, in turn and ultimately, the identity-making facts (what makes it the case that Socrates is the 
very thing that he is) as contrasted with the attribute-fixing facts (what makes it the case that 
SocratesÑidentity fixedÑis how he is). FineÕs 1994 asymmetry thesis is that xÕs being 
(metaphysically) necessarily F is necessary but not (even materially) sufficient for xÕs being 
essentially F. Some of FineÕs illustrations of insufficiency exploit exactly the same trick that 
Quine exploited in his anti-Church-Carnap proof above. The trick is to invoke that expansive 
conception of non-modal predicates that includes open sentences that have closed sentences as 
parts. Thus in FineÕs defence of insufficiency we have the likes of necessarily x is a philosopher or 
2+2=4 being true of Socrates but essentially x is a philosopher or 2+2=4 being (we are told) not true 
of Socrates. Various other kinds of illustrations are also invoked to exploit the ÔintuitionÕ that 
only some of what is metaphysically necessary of Socrates is attributable to his being the very 
thing that he is. For example, it is metaphysically necessary of Socrates that he is a member of 
the set {Socrates} and it is metaphysically necessary of {Socrates} that it has Socrates as a 
member. But while having Socrates as a member is essential to (grounded in the identity of) 
{Socrates}, we are told that being a member of {Socrates} is not essential toÑbecause not 
grounded in the identity ofÑSocrates.  
Thus, Fine exceeds QuineÕs prescience only by proceeding further in a direction along 
which Quine predicted only the minimum distance of travel that would be involved. From 
QuineÕs standpoint, the natural reaction to FineÕs defence of de re modal predication is as 
follows. It was never ruled out, and now it is proved, that the pursuit of a coherent worldview in 
which to embed de re modal predication might lead to even deeper metaphysical commitments 
than were predicted as the minimum in that regard. It goes with the genuinely modal territory, 
beyond Grade 1, and all agree, that we must abandon a purely extensional conception of logic. In 
modal logic, we can no longer freely intersubstitute expressions with the same extensionsÑfor 
example predicates tha apply to the same things, or statements with the same truth-value. For it 
is true that 2+2=4 and true that Quine is a philosopher. But when we substitute the latter for the 
former in the truth that it is necesssary that 2+2=4 we get the falsehood it is necessary that Quine is a 
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philosopher. Quine [TGMI 168ff] thought alsoÑfor reasons I have not had time to go intoÑthat 
the only coherent position for a friend of modality was one in which there was no stopping at 
the minimal modal logic of Grade 2. So acceptance of modality leads to acceptance of quantified 
modal logic, and with that evident intensionalist metaphysical commitments. For one would 
accept (in some cases) that it is a fundamental feature of the world, because it is so according to 
the canonical statement of best theory, that x is necessarily F. But if Fine is right, what is in 
prospect is a further push from Grade 3 on to a further (fourth) grade of non-extensional 
involvement that is not merely modal and not merely intensional. For in essential contexts, we 
can no longer freely intersubstitute expressions even when they are modally (that is, 
intensionally) equivalentÑfor example predicates that apply to exactly the same things in every 
possible circumstance or statements that necessarily have the same truth-value. For, on FineÕs 
view that will lead us from truth to falsehood in some cases where we substitute even modally 
equivalent predicates into x is essentially F. For it is true that Socrates is necessarily such that he is 
identical to Socrates and true that Socrates is necessarily such that either he or 2 is an even number, but while 
it is also tue that Socrates is essentially such that he is identical to Socrates it is (we are told) false that 
Socrates is essentially such that either he or 2 is an even number. Thus, in FineÕs scheme of things, 
acceptance of modality leads ultimately to not only intensionalist metaphysical commitments but 
to hyperintensionalist metaphysical commitments. For one would accept (in some cases) that it is 
a fundamental feature of the world, because it is so according to the canonical statement of best 
theory, that x is essentially F. So for Quine, the prospect raised by FineÕs prosecution of the 
Smullyan strategy is that of inflating the costs of defending de re modal predication to a greater 
level, by a whole order of magnitude, above those that he had dared CI Lewis, Church and 
Carnap to contemplate.  
 
7. Conclusion 
What Quine foresaw was this. (1) The project of defending quantified modal logic, and thereby 
de re modal predication as an element of canonical notation, is not doomed to be ineffective. 
But, (2) the only defensive strategy that has a chance of proving effective is the Smullyan strategy 
on which we reconceive strict modality as a language-independent modality. And, (3) once that 
step is taken, specific commitments to (at least) the following, are bound to ensue: the modal 
version of the doctrine of Aristotelian essentialism, some significant departures from the classical 
(Russellian, description-centred) treatment of variables and singular terms, and a quantified 
modal logic that has as a thesis the necessity of identity, (=). What Kripke does subsequently is 
to embrace entirely QuineÕs theses, (Q1)-(Q3) and try to make the package an attractive one. In 
doing so, Kripke accepts, with the first move, a presupposition that Quine shared: namely, that a 
defence of de re modal predication will locate it in the logic proper, and hence as a feature of 
canonical notation. What Lewis and Fine both do is to refuse that presupposition. Having done 
so, neither Lewis nor Fine takes issue with, nor confounds, QuineÕs predictions, (Q2) and (Q3) 
about the consequences of accepting that presupposition. I doubt that Quine was surprised by 
the emergence of the, obvious and natural, strategic thought that de re modal predication might 
be defended as a non-canonical (reducible) aspect of Ôtotal theoryÕ. Perhaps QuineÕs only surprise 
would have been at the metaphysical lengths to which these philosophers have been prepared to 
go to in mounting such a defence. For the metaphysical postulates in question are, with Lewis, 
an infinity of universes across which every metaphysical possibility is realized and, with Fine, a 
universe that is more radically non-extensional than Quine took even the ancient worldview of 
Aristotelian essentialism to suggest.34 
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